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CHAPTER I 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
What is the most effective concession making strategy 
in bargaining? Presently there are several answers to 
this question. Two of these answers contradict each other. 
The reciprocity explanation of concession making prescribes 
softness in bargaining. The level of aspiration hypothesis 
argues for bargaining toughness. The major research 
question of this study is "Is reciprocity theory's 
softness more effective than level of aspiration theory's 
toughness?" 
Conflict is a significant aspect of human life. 
Researchers and theorists prescribe a variety of methods 
of controlling, managing, or withdrawing from conflicts 
with others. Bargaining is one of these methods. This 
study concerns itself with the bargaining approach to 
resolving conflicts 
Several bargaining research paradigms have been developed 
in order to study the bargaining process. Four of these 
research paradigms, the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Parcheesi 
Coalition Game, the Acme-Bolt Trucking Game, and bilateral 
monopoly bargaining, have been used often enough to merit 
being called major bargaining research paradigms. Rubin and 
Brown (1975) determined that Prisoner's Dilemma has accounted 
for more than 300 of the bargaining studies done within the 
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last decade. The Parcheesi Coalition Game accounted for 
approximately forty studies, twenty-five or so studies used the 
Acme-Bolt Trucking Game, and approximately twenty-five studies 
have been conducted using the bilateral monopoly paradigm (p. 20). 
Comparing Four Bargaining Paradigms 
Prisoner's Dilemma takes its name from the following 
predicament described by Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 95)· 
Two subjects are taken into custody and separated 
The district attorney is certain they are guilty 
of a specific crime, but he does not have adequate 
evidence to convict them at a trial. He points out 
to each prisoner that each has two alternatives. 
to confess to the crime the police are sure they 
have done or not to confess If they both do 
not confess then the district attorney will 
book them on some very minor trumped-up charge 
such as petty larceny and illegal possession of 
a weapon, and they will receive minor punishment; 
if they both confess they will be prosecuted, but 
he will recommend less than the most severe 
sentence, but if one confesses and the other does 
not, then the confessor will receive lenient 
treatment for turning state's evidence whereas 
the latter will get '' the book'' slapped at him. 
The weakness of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game as a way of 
researching bargaining is that whereas bargaining involves 
the exchange of offers and counteroffers, Prisoner's Dilemma 
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involves two simultaneous "offers.'' In Prisoner's Dilemma 
each person makes a choice between a competitive option and 
a cooperative option. Each person makes this choice 
incommunicado and simultaneously in respect to the other 
person's choice This situation is different than bargaining 
where offers and counteroffers are made sequentially, not 
simultaneously. Rubin and Brown (1975, p. 25) wrote 
In summary, the PD paradigm contains many, but 
by no means all, of the characteristics of a true 
bargaining relationship In light of this fact, 
it is interesting that so much research has been 
conducted using this relatively simple, if elegant 
game, and that so much reliance has been placed 
on the findings to emerge. Much of the PD 
research is obviously interesting and important. 
In interpreting this work, however, its limitations 
as a bargaining paradigm should be kept in mind, 
and PD results - whenever possible - should be 
interpreted in relation to findings that have 
emerged using other, 0 truer" bargaining paradigms. 
The Parcheesi Coalition paradigm focuses on coalition 
formation in trios. It is thus outside the interests of 
this study of bilateral bargaining. 
The Acme-Bolt Trucking Game has been generally 
interpreted to intrinsicially emphasize two variables that 
are not of major interest in this study, namely threat 
potential and threat use. Additionally the Acme-Bolt 
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Trucking Game has the same characteristic that makes Prisoner's 
Dilemma different than bargaining. This limiting characteristic 
is the simultaneous choices of cooperation or competition rather 
than the sequential exchange of offers. 
In summary, note that Prisoner's Dilemma, Parcheesi 
Coalition, and the Acme-Bolt Trucking Game are less desirable 
paradigms for studying bargaining than the bilateral monopoly 
paradigm. As noted by Rubin and Brown (1975, pp. 29-30) 
"While several of the paradigms we have already examined 
contain many or all of the characteristics of a true 
bargaining relationship, they tend to bear relatively little 
resemblance to more familiar bargaining encounters." 
Siegal and Fouraker's (1960) bilateral monopoly paradigm 
is important because it does resemble actual bargaining 
encounters. Two players, the lone buyer and the lone seller 
of some type of imaginary merchandise (cars, ocean facility 
rights, micro-circuit technology, iron ore) negotiate the 
particular price (and sometimes the quantity) at which 
this merchandise will be bought or sold. Negotiators are 
usually given a profit table of their potential profits, 
and are sometimes given their opponent's profit table as 
well. This paradigm, " .. not only has most of the 
characteristics of a true bargaining relationship but 
considerable face validity as well." (Rubin & Brown, 1975, 
p. 30). Accordingly the bilateral monopoly paradigm was 
selected from the four major research paradigms used to study 
bargaining. 
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The Concession-Making Process 
Bilateral monopoly theorists and researchers often focus 
on explaining and predicting concession making. In Negotiation 
Behavior, Pruitt (1981) details his two explanations for 
negotiation, the goal/expectation hypothesis and the strategic 
choice model. Both theories have as a central issue an 
explanation of concession making. Furthermore, Pruitt's 
Chapter One is exclusively focused on explaining concession 
making. In Process and Outcome of Negotiations, Bartos 
(1974, p. 26) wrote that the main problem in explaining 
negotiation is to understand the impact of concessions. 
Bacharach and Lawler (1981, p. xi) wrote: "the basic choice· 
confronting bargainers is how large or small, tough or soft, 
their concessions should be" Hamner and Yukl (1977, p. 140) 
stated that a concession-making strategy is a key issue in 
bargaining. "It is important to examine strategies of bargaining 
since one of the key problems facing a bargainer in a conflict 
situation is deciding what type of concession-making 
strategy is most effective." These reviewers of the research 
stated what is evident, namely that bilateral monopoly 
studies often focus on explaining and predicting concession 
making. This study continues in that same research tradition 
It aims at understanding more completely the concession making 
process as it begins to unfold in the bilateral monopoly 
situation. 
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Seven Theories of Concession Making 
Seven different explanations of concession making have 
been noted by researchers when reviewing the negotiation 
research literature (Druckman & Bonoma, 1976, Hamner & 
Yukl, 1977). Four can be called strategies· (1) Siegel 
and Fouraker's (1960) 'tough' strategy; (2) Bartos (1967) 
and Komorita's (1972) 'moderately tough' or 'intermediate' 
strategy; (3) Osgood's (1962) 'reciprocity' or 'soft' 
strategy; and (4) Schelling's (1960) 'fair' strategy. A 
fifth explanation of concession making advanced by Esser 
and Komorita (1975) argued that the opponent's toughness, 
moderate toughness, softness, or fairness is irrelevant. 
"Finally, a third alternative (Kelley, Beckman, & Fischer, 
1967) assumes that the opponent's concession making has no 
effect on the bargainer's concessions Rather each bargainer 
tends to follow a predetermined offer schedule which is 
largely unaffected by the opponent's concessions." 
(Esser & Komorita, 1975, p. 865). 
A sixth explanation of concession making developed 
by Bacharach and Lawler (1981, pp. xi-xii) stated that 
concession making strategy is dependent upon perceptions of 
one's own power relative to on~'s opponent's power. 
Chapter Three applies the framework on bargaining 
power to concessions. The basic choice confronting 
bargainers is how large or small, tough or soft 
their concessions should be. Toughness may extract 
more concessions from an opponent, but it also has 
the drawback of increasing the chance of an 
impasse Chapter Three examines how bargainers 
use dimensions of bargaining power to make 
decisions on how tough to be in the bargaining. 
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The seventh explanation of concession making rests solely 
on one study, Wall (1977). Wall suggested a bargainer should 
reward any sizeable concession by an opponent with a large 
concession until he/she has operantly conditioned his/her 
opponent to make large concessions Wall then prescribes a 
contingent reciprocity, which is basically softness. 
Level of Aspiration Hypothesis 
The level of aspiration hypothesis is generally credited 
to Siegel and Fouraker (1960) They have suggested that the 
concept began as a general hypothesis which helped explain 
many types of goal-striving behavior (Frank, 1941; Rotter, 
1942). "Level of aspiration" may be defined as the 
magnitude of the goal toward which an individual is striving 
Siegel and Fouraker applied this general notion specifically 
to goal-striving in the bargaining situation. In the 
bargaining situation one's level of aspiration is that level 
of payoff toward which a bargainer is striving. Level of 
aspiration was asserted to be an underlying factor of a 
bargainer's expectancy and a bargainer's "bargaining 
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strength" "(These results) . . . suggest that the basis 
of both a bargainer's 'expectancy' and, at least partially, 
of his 'bargaining strength' may very well be his level of 
aspiration" (p. 60). 
Siegel and Fouraker manipulated bargainers' levels of 
aspiration to test whether level of aspiration could affect 
bargaining outcomes. They reported that a high level of 
aspiration bargainer who bargained with a low level of 
aspiration bargainer did tend to obtain a larger payoff 
advantage by the time the bargaining has ended. The 
theoretical explanation was that a high level of aspiration 
is one determinant of bargaining strength and that bargaining 
strength is one among many of the "personal characteristics" 
which account for success at bargaining. 
Although Siegel and Fouraker did not write any formal 
statements about the effect of a specific concession on a 
bargainer's aspiration level, such formulations can be 
inferred from their conclusions concerning level of 
aspiration 
The general conclusions which may reasonably be 
drawn from research on level of aspiration to 
date are· (1) experiences of success generally 
lead to a raising of the level of aspiration, 
and experiences of failure to a lowering; (2) 
the stronger the success, the greater the 
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probability of a rise in level 9f aspiration; 
the stronger the failure, the greater the probability 
of a lowering (p. 62). 
When these conclusions are adapted to considering the effect 
of no concession, a small concession, or a large concession 
upon a bargainer's level of aspiration, the following seem 
to be easily inferred· (1) the larger the opponent's 
concession, the greater the rise in a person's level of 
aspiration; (2) the smaller the concession, the smaller the 
rise in a person's level of aspiration; and (3) no concession 
at all from one's bargaining opponent might lower one's 
aspiration level. 
The general bargaining advice from the level of 
aspiration hypothesis is to bargain tough; start with extremely 
tough offers, make few concessions, and make small concessions 
rather than large concessions. Recent studies (Bartos, 1960, 
1966, 1967, 1970, 1974, Benton, 1971; Benton, Kelley & 
Liebling, 1972; Chertkoff & Baird, 1971; Chertkoff & Conley, 
1967, Cialdini et al., 1979, Druckman & Bonoma, 1976, 
Druckman et al., 1972; Hamner & Harnett, 1975, Harnett et al, 
1973, Hinton, Hamner, & Pohlen, 1974; Holmes, Throop, & 
Strickland, 1971, Komorita & Barnes, 1969; Komorita & 
Brenner, 1968, Liebert et al , 1968; & Yukl, 1972, 1973, 
1974a, 1974b) provide support for the level of aspiration 
hypothesis. 
A series of studies by Bartos (1960, 1966, 1967, 1970, 
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1974) supported the Siegel and Fouraker "be tough" theory 
as well as the "moderate toughness" approach. His results 
supported both approaches because Bartos found that toughness 
greatly increases profit when agreement is reached, but 
simultaneously toughness greatly increases the odds of 
bargaining deadlock, which means no profit for the bargainer. 
On "toughness" Bartos (1974, p. 237) concluded "Inspection 
of Figure 9.1 suggests that the high final payoff was 
received most often by the subjects who were extremely tough. 
Moreover, we see that the relationship between toughness 
and the probability of high final payoff is monotone 
increasing, the tougher the subject was, the more likely 
he was to receive a high final payoff. Thus, ex post facto at 
least, toughness is shown by our data to be a good strategy." 
On toughness and deadlock Bartos (1974, p 302) summarized 
"Toughness decreases the chances of an agreement." 
Hamner and Yukl (1977) interpreted Barto's research as 
evidence of a curvilinear relationship between toughness 
and profit, with a moderately tough offer strategy being as 
effective as a very tough strategy "Apparently, as a 
negotiator's toughness increased, he obtained greater 
concessions from the other negotiator, but fewer agreements 
occurred Since deadlocks resulted in zero profit, more 
than a moderate degree of toughness failed to produce any 
increase in the mean level of profits" (p 145). Bartos's 
11 
subjects were college students recruited from social science 
classes and included a variety of ethnic representation. 
Bartos's research paradigm involved five party negotiation 
over political issues. Sometimes the students role played 
five U.S. Senators. In other experiments they role played 
five heads of state In others they role played fictitious 
heads of state such\as ALGO, ERGA, INGO, OMNE, and UTRO. 
Each subject always knew ms/her own payoffs Communication 
was unrestricted except in one important way No 
negotiator was allowed to reveal whathis/herpayoffs for a 
particular political agreement were. Bartos's negotiators 
must therefore be classified as unilaterally profit informed. 
Negotiations were allowed to continue until agreement was 
reached or until the time limit of two hours was exhausted. 
Benton (1971) contrasted ~ard IO (a tough initial offer)/ 
no concession, hard IO/moderate concession, and soft IO/no 
concession. The "soft IO/no concession condition" tested 
Schelling's "fair" strategy which says one should quickly 
concede to the fair settlement point, and then make no 
further concessions The subjects, who knew their opponent's 
payoffs, achieved the greatest profits with the hard IO/ 
moderate concession strategy. 
Benton, Kelley, and Liebling (1972) examined the effects 
of extremity of initial offer and toughness or softness of 
concession making upon bargaining outcomes. The experiment 
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involved simulated bilateral bargaining among college 
psychology students at U.C.L.A. Conrrnunication was restricted 
to offers only. No prominent or fair outcome was provided. 
Some bargained without knowledge of their opponent's 
payoffs; others had such information. Benton et al. 
advanced the following conclusions Unilateral profit 
informed bargainers made more extreme offers during the 
early stages of bargaining than did bilateral profit 
informed bargainers. These extreme demands elicited 
extreme counterdemands. The demand strategy of an extreme 
initial offer followed by moderate concessions was more 
effective than either an extremely tough initial offer with 
further toughness in concessions or an extremely soft 
initial offer coupled with intransigence from this soft 
intitial offer. 
Chertkoff and Baird (1971), although primarily 
studying the effectiveness of deceiving a bargaining 
opponent, found evidence that toughness in bargaining is 
more successful than softness. They explained that the 
perceived motive or cause of the toughness is crucial: 
An attributional analysis suggests that for tough 
bargaining to be successful, a bargainer must 
become convinced that the toughness being exhibited 
by the opponent is not due to ,excessive greed. As 
long as an opponent shows some willingness to 
compromise, his protracted toughness may convince 
a bargainer that he is not trying to win an 
overwhelming victory, but rather is merely 
responding to his profit schedule. Hence, 
yielding finally occurs. Tough bargaining should 
be more successful, then, if it appears to be 
caused by economic necessity rather than personal 
greed. (Chertkoff & Esser, 1971, pp 481-482). 
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Chertkoff and Baird discovered that tough demands thought to 
be caused by a high breakeven point were effective in 
eliciting substantial concessions 
In order to study initial offers and concession frequency, 
Cher~koff and Conley (1967) asked female college students to 
simulate the purchase of a used car. The experimental 
instructions to the subjects appeared to be designed to 
enhance a competitive motivation• "Remember you are trying 
to buy the car for the lowest price possible ... This 
experiment is designed to test your skill in bargaining. 
Make every effort to buy the car for as low a price as 
possible." (p. 182). Conrrnunication was restricted to 
exchanging written price offers. All bargained knowing 
only her own potential profits. The major findings were 
consistent with the predictions of a level of aspiration 
explanation. An extreme initial offer was more effective in 
obtaining profits than a moderate offer An extreme initial 
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offer allowed greater room to concede. This room to concede 
was useful in eliciting further concessions from the 
opponent by making small concessions An extreme opening 
offer coupled with infrequent concessions was best for 
bargaining success. More frequent concessions elicited more 
frequent concessions, but not greater movement - just nominal 
concessions. "Getting your opponent to concede more 
frequently is an empty gain if more frequent concessions do 
not result in greater total movement''(p. 183). 
Cialdini et al. (1979) used actual new car bargaining 
rather than simulated car bargaining. Their study thus 
provided an interesting contrast to the typical laboratory 
simulation where the opponents are college students, who 
may not have experienced many negotiations Cialdini et al., 
noted. "In a naturally-occurring automobile sales interaction, 
however, one's opponent is often a professional salesman with 
years of bargaining experience .. " (p. 119). Toughness 
consisted of refusing all of the salesman's offers on a 
Chevy Impala before bargaining about the price of a Monte 
Carlo. Softness consisted of saying that the first price 
offered on an Impala was satisfactory before bargaining 
about the price of a Monte Carlo. The tough bargaining on 
the Impala was found to be effective in lowering the price 
on the Monte Carlo. 
Cohen (1980) offered a tidbit of anecdotal evidence that 
softness is ineffective. Cohen argued that· 
During the armistice negotiation ending the Korean 
War, both sides stated their initial demands 
regarding the location of the final truce line. 
Obviously, they were far apart. Suddenly the 
United Nations negotiators, departing from 
appropriate adversary bargaining practices, made 
a quick major concession. In trying to be 
conciliatory with the 'Soviets' from North Korea, 
we actually revealed our final fallback position 
Instead of this being perceived as reasonableness, 
it gave the impression of weakness to our opponents 
and hardened their negotiating posture. The 
American admiral, C. Turner Joy, who headed the 
U. N. negotiating team at Panmunjon, later 
admitted that this quick concession (which was 
never returned in kind) gave the Communists a 
big advantage in the negotiations (p. 141). 
Druckman and Bonoma (1976) arranged for 52 eighth 
grade boys to participate in buyer-seller interactions. 
Their results suggested starting soft and becoming 
increasingly tough produces deadlocks "Supplementary 
data analysis suggest that this reaction resulted from 
the realization that they were taken advantage of by 
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their nonreciprocating opponent" (p. 261). Softness was 
not reciprocated; it lead to increased aspiration. 
Druckman and Bonoma advised bargainers that starting tough 
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and becoming soft is the better concession making strategy 
on the basis of their study 
In another study which focused on the bargaining of 
young boys, Druckman et al. (1972) documented a raised 
aspiration effect following softness As sellers became 
increasingly soft, buyers became increasingly tough. 
However, toughness was "reciprocated" with toughness It 
should be pointed out that all bargainers negotiated with 
bilateral profit information 
One-hundred and sixty male undergraduate students from 
introductory business courses simulated bargaining in a 
study by Hamner and Harnett (1975). Hamner and Harnett 
found that bilaterally profit informed bargainers had more 
realistic expectations of profit, made less extreme initial 
offers, and made less profit. They further discovered that 
information about one's opponent's profits tended to lower 
the aspirations of bargainers starting with high aspirations 
and tended to raise the aspirations of bargainers starting 
with low aspirations. Bilateral profit information 
corrected unrealistic aspirations. 
Harnett et al. (1973) studied three types of bargaining 
strategies. The tough strategy started with an extreme 
initial offer and followed with infrequent small or moderate 
concessions. The 11 intermediate strategy" started with a 
moderate initial offer and followed through with moderate 
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concessions. The soft strategy consisted of a soft initial 
offer, followed by an early concession to a fair offer, 
with small or no concessions thereafter. The largest 
profits were earned by bargainers using the tough strategy. 
Hinton, Hamner, and Pohlen (1974) found that bargainers 
achieved higher profits when they made extreme rather than 
moderate initial demands. The twenty-four graduate business 
students bargained without bilateral profit information. 
Holmes, Throop, and Strickland (1971) studied forty-
eight male psychology students in a bilateral monopoly 
bargaining situation. Negotiators with high levels of 
aspiration had higher initial demands, smaller concessions, 
and received more profit. The negotiators were not 
informed about their opponent's profit tables. 
Komorita and Barnes (1969) examined the buyer-seller 
negotiation of one hundred and sixty male undergraduate 
psychology students. Primarily studying the effect of 
pressure to settle on bargaining, they also reported that 
a tough bargaining strategy is effective if coupled with 
pressure to settle All negotiators bargained with a 
clearly defined range of $50 as an unacceptable low price 
for the seller and $100 as the seller's starting price. 
Komorita and Brenner (1968) examined four offer 
strategies, which in order from softest to toughest were· 
(1) a fair initial offer and no subsequent concessions; 
(2) 100 percent reciprocation; (3) 50 percent reciprocation; 
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and (4) 10 percent reciprocation. The greatest profits 
were obtained by the least reciprocation - by the toughest 
strategies. 
Liebert et al. (1968) studied the bargaining of forty 
male college students in an automobile selling game. Those 
who bargained knowing only their own potential profit raised 
their demands upon receiving a favorable concession. Such 
bargainers used their opponent's first bids to set an 
aspiration level. Those who bargained knowing both their 
own potential profit and their opponent's potential profit 
tended to reciprocate extreme demand with extreme demand 
and tended to reciprocate a "generous" initial offer with 
a moderate concession. 
Eighty high school students played a bilateral buyer-
seller game in the 1972 study by Rubin and DiMatteo. All 
bargained knowing only their own potential profit. 
Bargainers who received "generous" concessions raised their 
aspirations and bargained tougher. 
In a series of experiments Yukl (1972, 1973, 1974a, 1974b) 
found that toughness resulted in greater profits. Yukl 
studied buyer-seller negotiations among college students. 
Most bargained without knowledge of their opponent's 
potential payoffs. When subjects knew their opponents' 
payoffs this aspiration level increase/toughness effect 
did not hold. 
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There is one study that neither supports the reciprocity 
hypothesis nor the level of aspiration theory's "be tough" 
strategy. Kahn and Kohls (1972) asked male students from an 
undergraduate psychology class to engage in a buyer-seller 
game. Unilateral profit informed bargainers made higher 
initial offers, had higher aspirations, but tended to earn 
lower profits. 
So at least two dozen studies provide support for the 
level of aspiration hy1pothesis. The.se studies reveal that 
starting with and continuing with extremely tough offers is 
a more successful strategy than softness. The theoretical 
explanation is that toughness lowers opponents' aspirations 
Reciprocity Hypothesis 
Reciprocity has been assumed to play a role in a number 
of social situations (Adams, 1965, Gouldner, 1960, Homans, 
1961, Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973) In bargaining 
situations the reciprocity hypothesis states that bargainers 
will operate in a tit-for-tat manner In other words 
concessions per se will be reciprocated and the magnitude 
of concessions will be reciprocated. The bargaining advice 
from the reciprocity hypothesis is to match a concession with 
a concession and match the size of a concession with one of 
equal softness or hardness. In contrast to the aspiration 
level hypothesis, the reciprocity hypothes suggests 
that sometimes generous concessions can be effective in 
eliciting concessions from one's opponent. 
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Esser and Komorita (1975) asked fifty-five male 
undergraduate students from a psychology class to bargain 
about the sale price of a used appliance in Experiment I. 
They asked 78 others to bargain in Experiment II. Subjects 
had full knowledge of their opponent's profit scheme. 
Esser and Komorita contrasted a concession matching 
condition (100 percent reciprocation) with two conditions 
in which an equal magnitude of total concessions occurred, 
but these concessions were delayed into catch-up concessions. 
These other two conditions consisted of fifty percent 
innnediate reciprocation and twenty-five percent innnediate 
reciprocation with the other fifty percent/seventy-five 
delayed into catch-up concessions. Esser and Komorita 
concluded that immediacy, size, and frequency are all 
important aspects of reciprocity. The results supported 
the reciprocity hypothesis in that final offers were more 
profitable to the bargainers using 100 percent reciprocation. 
Despite this support several necessary qualifications of the 
reciprocity hypothesis were noted First, costs for 
deadlocks were nonexistent, and high costs for deadlock 
tend to make toughness an effective strategy. Second, " .. 
the validity of the reciprocity hypothesis may be restricted 
to situations in which there is sufficient information 
to evaluate a reciprocal strategy as being fair or unfair'' 
(p. 870). 
Hamner (1974) examined whether after a stalemate in 
negotiations, toughness, moderate toughness, softness, 
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or fairness was a superior concession making strategy. 
Toughness was manipulated to be 50 percent reciprocation, 
moderate toughness was 75 percent reciprocation, softness 
was 100 percent reciprocation, and fairness was making one 
even-split offer. Softness was superior in this study in 
terms of maximizing profits. 
Hinton et al. (1974) asked twenty-four MBA candidates 
to transact the sale of "micro-circuit technology" in 
repeated bargaining sessions. Subjects who conceded at a 
higher rate earned more profits because they had fewer 
deadlocks. Hinton et al. also attributed this reciprocity/ 
softness finding to high pressure to reach agreement and 
in part to the fact that partieipants bargained with the 
same opponent in a series of separate sales negotiations. 
Hinton et al. wrote "It is obvious that .the subjects who 
reach agreement earn more money Our results seem to 
indicate that a bargainer should actively cooperate with 
his bargaining partner by either making a fairly sizeable 
concession on the opening bid, or by having a reasonably 
high concession rate during the negotiation period." 
(p. 202). 
Ninety-five female students from undergraduate psychology 
classes bargained over the price of a used appliance in a 
study by Komorita and Esser (1975). All bargained with 
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bilateral profit information. A higher concession rate 
triggered a higher proportion of settlements rather than 
deadlocks and consequently greater profit. 
Lawler and MacMurray (1980) studied the negotiations of 
one hundred and twenty college females bargaining about the 
price of iron ore. All bargained with unilateral profit 
information. The authors suggested that their results 
supported a reciprocity of frequency of concessions. 
Michener et al. (1975) studied the bilateral negotiations 
of eighty male college students. These students simulated 
the negotiations under two power conditions, strong and 
weak. All negotiated with information about the other's 
punishment magnitude but not with knowledge of the other's 
payoffs. Strong power position bargainers tended to raise 
their aspirations in response to soft concessions. Weak 
power position bargainers used a reciprocity strategy of 
matching soft concessions. 
Pruitt and Johnson (1970) varied the number of offers 
in a bargaining round while holding the number of concessions 
constant. They discovered it made no difference if the 
opponent made few large concessions or many small concessions. 
Pruitt and Johnson documented a reciprocation of frequency 
of offers but not a reciprocity of magnitude of opponent 
concessions. 
The reciprocity hypothesis has been supported by at least 
23 
seven studies. These studies found that softness resulted 
in maximum profits. The main theoretical explanation is 
that softness causes fewer deadlocks 
Intennediate Toughness 
The Siegel and Fouraker (1960) "be tough" prescription 
is considered too extreme by some researchers. Bartos (1960, 
1966, 1967, 1970, 1974) noted toughness is an excellent 
way to maximize profits if an agreement is reached. However, 
toughness profits on the average are lowered by increased 
instances of no agreement. Komorita (1972) concurred with 
this analysis stating that there is a limit to the principle 
that toughness in bargaining pays. 
Benton et al. (1972) demonstrated that extreme levels 
of toughness are counterproductive. Their subjects achieved 
the greatest profits with a hard initial offer and then 
moderate concessions. 
Hinton et al. (1974) conducted a study in which 
bargainers interacted with the same opponent in a series of 
negotiations They argued such repeated negotiation 
characterizes labor union/management negotiations. The 
author indicated that some moderation of demand, either in 
the form of a soft initial offer or large concessions was 
necessary where there is a continuing relationship between 
the parties. 
Lawler and MacMurray (1980) argue that reciprocity is 
too soft, that Siegel and Fouraker's level of aspiration 
advice is too hard, and that "vigilant reicprocity" is just 
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right. Vigilant reciprocity is a mixture of toughness and 
softness. 
A 'vigilant' approach to reciprocity suggests that 
consistent softness will lead to exploitation rather 
than reciprocity; while, consistent toughness will 
tend to backfire and produce an impasse in 
negotiations. The 'vigilant' version of reciprocity 
implies that a mixture of tough and softer 
strategies will produce the most yielding by a 
bargainer. Specifically, toughness in the early 
phases of the bargaining or until an impasse is 
created will generate respect and avoid exploitation. 
Beyond the initial phases of bargaining, however, 
a reciprocal (i.e. matching) concession str~tegy 
will extract the largest concessions from the 
opponent. Thus, a 'vigilant' approach to 
reciprocity suggests that initial toughness combined 
with a later matching strategy will produce the 
greatest concessions (p. 418). 
Lawler and MacMurray (1980) discovered that fl tough 
initial stance coupled with reciprocated concessions 
produced profitable settlements as did a soft initial offer 
coupled with an extremely tough concession strategy. 
Morgan and Sawyer (1967) suggested that toughness will be 
restrained when the negotiator must consider the future payoffs 
as well as the present ones. They prescribe moderate 
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toughness over extreme toughness: "Wise persons, however do 
not treat every encounter like a used-car transaction where 
' 
they never expect to see others again, friends, instead, 
also take care that the other obtains an outcome sufficiently 
rewarding so that he is willing to interact again" (p. 140). 
Lawler and MacMurray (1980) interpreted Chertkoff and 
Esser (1976) to have argued that concession strategies are 
important primarily because of the impressions they create 
in opponents. Their advice is that a firm but reasonable 
approach will maximize an opponent's concessions. "A 
I 
bargainer must appear 'firm' in order to avoid exploitation 
and to lower the other's aspiration level; but, at the same 
time, a bargainer must convey a willingness to make 
concessions, i.e., appear reasonable. Behavior which gives, 
undue attention to only one of these dimensions, firm or 
reasonable, may engender less yielding than behavior which 
takes account of both impression-management dimensions 
(p. 427). 
In surrnnary, an alternative to toughness or softness has 
been anticipated. The intermediate toughness strategy has 
been supported by at least ten studies Some of the 
limitations of extreme toughness that have been discussed 
are increased instancesnf deadlocks and a deterioration of 
the continuing relationship between parties who will be 
bargaining with each other in the future. The limitation of 
extreme softness is it sometimes leads to being exploited. 
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Fair Strategies 
A fourth strategy of concession making is Schelling's 
fair strategy. Schelling (1960) suggested that bargainers 
often view a certain "prominent 0 settlement as the most fair 
to bot9 parties. Often this prominent point is a 50-50 
split of available profit. "The bargainer, in following the 
fair strategy, should not attempt to 'bluff' his opponent but 
instead should propose a settlement at the point where the 
prominent solution is reached. If communication is allowed, 
the bargainer should point out the fact that· this is the 
equitable solution and stay at this point until agreement is 
reached"(Hamner & Yukl, 1977, p. 142). 
Pruitt (1972) points out that there are many different 
definitions of fairness. Benton (1971) included a conditiop 
of soft initial offer followed by no further concessions, 
which he called a test of Schelling's "fair" strategy. The 
subjects knew their opponents payoffs. Benton found the 
fair strategy to be less profitaqle than either toughness 
or moderate toughness. 
Harnett et al., created a simulation of a fair 
strategy, that is conceding quickly to a fair offer and 
then making small or no concessions thereafter. This 
bargaining strategy, however, earned less profit than either 
toughness or moderate toughness. 
Little research has tested the fair strategy. Two 
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studies have found that fair strategies earned less profit 
than either toughness of softness. 
Independent Concession Strategies 
A fifth explanation of concession making has argued 
that toughness, moderate toughness, or softness is irrelevant. 
Esser and Komorita (1975) asserted that toughness may be 
irrelevant. "Rather, each bargainer tends to follow a 
predetermined offer schedule which is largely unaffected 
by the opponent's concessions'' (p. 865) Cann et al (1973) 
found support for this assertion. However, Hamner and Yukl 
(1977) argued that the study is confounded in two ways. First, 
the absolute magnitude of concessions was confounded with 
rate of concession Second, subjects knew they had the 
advantage of making a last chance final offer. Hamner and 
Yukl concluded· "In view of this confounding. .it is not 
surprising that the researchers found that the opponent's 
offer strategy did not affect the final subject offer" 
(Hamner & Yukl, 1977, p. 149) 
Hatton (1967) performed a study comparing rapid concession 
with slow concession of the same magnitude. There was no 
effect of opponent-offer strategy on the subject's final 
offer. 
Opponent concessions did not affect the final offer of 
subjects in a study by Pruitt and Drews (1969). The participants 
bargained with only unilateral profit knowledge Hamner and 
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Yukl argued: "The absence of a significant effect in this 
study was probably due to the use of opponent offers providing 
mostly negative payoffs for subjects, .. " (p. 147). 
Three studies have concluded that opponent concessions 
did not affect the offers or outcome in bargaining. Since 
many studies have connected opponent concessions to 
bargaining outcomes, more support is needed before this th~ory 
can be accepted. 
Concession Making and Power 
A sixth explanation of concession making involves the 
relative power of the two bargainers. " social 
psychologists tend to neglect bargaining power and thereby 
miss a potentially critical determinant of concession 
tactics. They emphasize the effectiveness of different 
concession tactics rather than the foundation of the 
tactics in the power relationship" (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981, 
p. 83). Komorita and Barnes (1969) varied the power by 
placing greater pressure to settle on half of the bargainers. 
Toughness was especially effective if a bargainer was under 
pressure to settle Michener et al. (1975) found that 
strong power position bargainers tended toward toughness, 
while weak power position bargainers tended toward reciprocity. 
While there is little research on this theory of 
concession-making, the one study completed does support the 
hypothesis that power position may be related to toughness or 
softness in bargaining 
Conditioning Concession Making 
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A seventh explanation of concession making suggested 
that one can behaviorally condition reciprocity. Wall (1977) 
designed four experiments to test the theory that concessions 
can be used to operantly condition an opponent's concessions. 
Reasoning that a bargainer values concessions, Wall argued 
that the negotiator can use hfsther o-...m concessions to reward 
acceptable opponent concessions. That is, the negotiator 
can give rewards in the form of concessions when the 
opponent makes concessions. The first three experiments 
provided no distinct test of an operant conditioning theory 
of concession making rather than the reciprocity theory. 
Since the overall concessions in the reward condition were 
larger than those in the control condition, one can contend 
that subjects in the operant conditioning condition simply 
reciprocated large concessions. In a fourth experiment each 
control subject received demands and concessions identical 
to the subject's counterpart in the operant conditioning 
condition. However, control subjects received these concessions 
in such a fashion that their concessions were not immediately 
rewarded. This more unequivocal test of the hypothesis 
indicated that rewarded subjects increased their concessions. 
Three Variables Which May Explain 
the Conflicting Hypothesis 
Since each of these different hypotheses has some empirical 
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support, the validity of these hypotheses must be examined 
in further research. This study will examine the effect 
of three variables upon the first counteroffer in a 
bargaining session. Only the first counteroffer will be 
studied because of its importance in the bargaining process. 
The Extent of the Bargainer's Profit Information 
One potential explanation for the inconsistencies in the 
research studies which focus on concession making behavior 
is the profit information condition of the bargainer. 
Some bargainers negotiate with full knowledge both of their 
possible profits and the profits of their partner. Such 
bargainers have been called complete information bargainers. 
Because knowledge other than profit table knowledge can be 
significant in a bargaining encounter (knowledge of 
bargaining procedures, for example), a preferable term 
would be a bargainer with bilateral profit information. A 
bargainer with bilateral profit information knows his/her own 
and his/her opponent's possible profits. A bargainer who only 
knows his/her own possible profits bargains with unilateral 
profit information. 
Research by several investigators (Kelley, 1966; Kelley, 
Beck.man, & Fischer, 1967, Liebert, Smith, Keiffer, & Hill, 
' 1968, Siegel & Fouraker, 1960) has shown that unilateral 
profit knowledge often results in bargainers making higher 
initial demands, making fewer concessions, and taking longer 
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to reach agreement. Simply put, unilateral profit knowledge 
results in bargaining toughness. This result is hypothesized 
to occur because when one lacks bilateral profit information 
it is difficult for that person to determine what constitutes 
an equitable agreeme~t. Therefore, uninformed bargainers 
start with comparatively high initial demands and make few 
concessions to protect themselves from giving away too much 
too soon, i.e., before they can estimate what an equitable 
agreement is from their opponent's offers. Such bargainers 
bargain cautiously and conservatively until they can collect 
some data from their opponent's offers Rubin and Brown 
(1975) have noted that when a bargainer lacks knowledge of 
the other's possible profits, a concession can provide a 
clue about the other's utility values and toughness (p. 261) 
So, it is more effective to bargain cautiously until those 
clues are provided in the form of concessions from an opponent. 
Liebert, Smith, Keiffer, and Hill (1968) have demonstrated 
that the profit information state of bargainers affects 
whether they reciprocate the magnitude of a concession or 
readjust their level of aspiration accordingly. Their results 
support the hypothesis that unilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers use opponents' bids to set their own goals (the 
aspiration level hypothesis). Bilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers tended to assess the reasonableness of opponents' 
bids and respond in kind (which is the reciprocity hypothesis). 
Only the bargainer with bilateral profit knowledge has enough 
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information to compare a bid to possible splits of the 
potential profit in order to check for "reasonableness" or 
"competitiveness or cooperativeness." This is an important 
foundation of reciprocity explanations as stated by Esser 
and Komorita (1975): 
In addition, subjects in the present study had full 
knowledge of their opponent's profit scheme. This 
is another important variable restricting the 
generality of the results, because the reciprocity 
hypothesis assumes that a bargainer must first 
perceive violations of reciprocity and then react 
against this attempt at exploitation. Hence, the 
validity of the reciprocity hypothesis may be 
restricted to situations in which there is 
sufficient information to evaluate a reciprocal 
strategy as being fair or unfair (p. 866). 
Esser and Komorita did in fact fully inform bargainers about 
their opponents' possible profits. These bilateral profit 
knowledge bargainers exhibited reciprocity just like the 
bilateral profit knowledge bargainers in the Liebert et al. 
(1968) study. Benton (1971) discovered that bilateral profit 
knowledge bargainers tended to reciprocate a minimal 
concession with a minimal concession. These three studies 
would suggest bilateralness of profit knowledge is a 
precondition to reciprocity of concessions. 
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Unilateral profit knowlege has produced aspiration level 
effects in several studies. Liebert et' al. (1968) compared 
unilateral profit knowledge to bilateral profit knowledge as 
a manipulated variable. Unilateral profit knowledge bargainers 
who received a generous first concession did not reciprocate 
the generosity Rather, each made a mean counteroffer which 
gave himself 107% of the possible profit and his opponent 
-7% of the possible profit. Similarly, Chertkoff and 
Conley (1967) noted that unilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers responded to a hard initial offer with a soft 
final offer level. Bartos (1966, 1967), Komorita and 
Barnes (1969), and Komorita and Brenner (1968) all support 
the aspiration level hypothesis advice that small concessions 
are best when the opponent is only unilaterally informed 
about profits. 
Siegel and Fouraker (1960) studied eight bargaining pairs 
where both parties had bilateral profit knowledge. Although 
no data are available about whether concessions were 
reciprocated concession by concession, Siegal and Fouraker 
did report that six of these eight pairs divided the available 
profit in an exact 50%/50% split, (p. 58). They found that 
bilateral profit knowledge bargainers were "softer" in 
their initial offers than were unilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers, (p. 59). Siegel and Fouraker postulated that 
bilateral profit knowledge bargainers have more realistic 
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expectations of profit, (p. 70). These conclusions demonstrate 
the tendency of bilateral profit knowledge bargainers to offer 
generous concessions and split profit, which are two key 
components of a reciprocity theory. The following 
hypotheses concerning unilateral or bilateral profit 
knowledge are posited. 
Unilateral Versus Bilateral Profit Knowledge Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One Bilateral profit knowledge bargainers will 
exhibit more reciprocity of concession magnitude than will 
unilateral profit knowledge bargainers 
Hypothesis Two: Unilateral profit knowledge bargainers, more 
often than bilateral profit knowledge bargainers will offer 
concessions of a large magnitude to an extremely small initial 
concession and of a small magnitude to an extremely large 
initial concession. 
Hypothesis Three Unilateral profit knowledge bargainers will 
modify their aspiration levels in response to the opponent's 
initial concession significantly more than will bilateral 
profit knowledge bargainers. 
Hypothesis Four· Unilateral profit knowledge bargainers 
will raise their aspirations in response to a generous first 
concession. 
Hypothesis Five Unilateral profit knowledge bargainers will 
lower their aspirations in response to an extremely small 
initial concession. 
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The Magnitude of the Initial Offer 
A second variable which might account for either adjusted 
aspiration level or reciprocity is the extremity of the initial 
offer. Rubin and Brown (1975) have summarized the importance 
of the initial offer and counteroffer: 
The course of bargaining is largely determined by 
the initial offers and counteroffers made by each 
side. Early moves and gestures are critical in the 
creation of the psychological setting It is 
here that rules and norms are first implanted, 
issues such as trust and bargaining toughness 
are considered for the first time, and the 
division of resources to which each party aspires 
are presented for the other's consideration (p. 260) 
Opening moves strongly influence the outcomes of 
bargaining sessions In the prisoner's dilemma p'aradigm, 
initial choices are limited to either a cooperative choice 
or a competitive choice. The most general conclusion of 
prisoner's dilennna research concerning initial choices is 
that the early initiation of cooperative choices tends to 
elicit cooperative choices from the other party Similarly, 
initially choosing the competitive choice tends to induce 
the other party to reciprocate with the competitive option. 
Research (Crumbaugh & Evans, 1967; Michelini, 1971; Oskamp, 
1970, Sermet & Gregovich, 1966, Tedeschi, Hiester, Lesnick, 
& Gahager, 1968) supports this idea. However, Bixenstine, 
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Potash, and Wilson (1963), Bixenstine and Wilson (1963), and 
Sermat (1964) found no difference as a function of the other's 
initial cooperative or competitive behavior. 
Pilsak and Rapoport (1964) have described the "lock-in" 
effect. This effect describes the tendency of bargaining 
pairs to quickly fall into a pattern of either mutual cooperation 
or mutual competition. When lock-ins occur, they begin early 
in the bargaining and persist for the remainder of the 
interaction. Lock-in effects are a demonstration of 
reciprocated toughness. 
Not only does pr oner's dilerrnna research show the 
importance of initial posturings, but it also shows the 
dramatic importance of the first offer Komorita (1973), 
Oskamp (1970), Rapopore and Chammah (1965), and Terhune 
(1968) each found that whether the first move was cooperative 
or competitive has a strong influence on the outcome of a 
prisoner's dilerrnna game. 
When the bilateral monopoly paradigm is used instead of 
prisoner's dilemma, the magnitude of initial cooperation can 
be manipulated. Several such studies have examined the effects 
of extreme versus moderate opening offers upon bargaining 
outcomes. Chertkoff and Conley (1967) found that bargainers 
achieved higher outcomes when they made extreme rather than 
moderate initial demands. Hinton, Hamner, and Pohlen (1974) 
concluded the same. The strategy of making an initial offer 
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at the level one expected to settle at eventually was found to 
be ineffective by Komor and Brenner (1968). 
Benton, Kelley, and Liebling (1972) compared three 
strategies of concession making· (1) extreme initial demand 
followed by continued extreme demand; (2) minimal demand 
followed by continued minimal demand; and extreme initial 
demand followed by gradual concessions. Their conclusion 
was that the best way to maximize joint profit is to start 
extreme and gradually concede. Such a conclusion emphasized 
that both initial demands and further demands are important. 
However, Pruitt and Drews (1969) have argued that sixty-seven 
percent of the variance in subsequent demands is accounted 
for by the initial demands 
Rubin and DiMatteo (1972) compared subjects in a bilateral 
monopoly situation who were offered an extremely generous 
initial offer with subjects who were offered an extremely 
ungenerous initial offer. A generous initial concession raised 
the aspiration level of bargainers. It also usually resulted 
in greater final profit for the recipient of the generous 
initial offer. Yukl (1974) has supported this conclusion. 
Liebert, Smith, Hill, and Keiffer (1968) studied the 
interaction between the magnitude of initial offers and the 
bilateralness or unilateralness of profit knowledge. 
Against a bargainer who knows onlyhis/herown possible profits, 
high initial demands led to lower counteroffers. On the 
other hand, when bargainers had information about both 
their own and their opponent's possible profits, extreme 
initial demands led to extreme counteroffers 
38 
In summary, it is apparent that the initial offer is 
an important variable in bargaining. That fact, along with 
the interaction between level of initial demand and the 
completeness of profit information, requires the inclusion 
of the magnitude of the initial offer as a variable in this 
study. Specifically, initial offer magnitude may well help 
explain some of the inconsistent findings regarding the 
aspiration level hypothesis and the reciprocity hypothesis. 
Magnitude of Initial Offer Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Six The preceived competitiveness or cooperation 
of the opponent will be a function of the size of the initial 
concession received. Extremely large (small) initial 
concessions will lend to attributions of cooperation 
(competition). 
Hypotheses Seven· Bilateral profit knowledge bargainers will 
respond to a large (small) initial concession with a reciprocally 
large (small) concession 
Motivational Orientation of the Bargainer 
A third variable of interest is the motivational 
orientation of the bargainer. Motivational orientation 
describes a bargainer's attitudinal disposition toward the 
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other bargainer Deutsch (1960, 1973) describes three types 
of motivational orientation A cooperative motivational 
orientation means a positive interest in the other's profits 
as well as one's own A competitive motivational orientation 
indicates an interest in doing better than the other and 
in maximizing one's own profits. An individualistic motivational 
orientation denotes an interest in maximizing one's own pr9fits 
regardless of how the other fares. 
The archetypal studies of motivational orientation were 
conducted by Deutsch (1958, 1960, 1973) Deutsch found that 
motivational orientation as a variable produced sharp effects, 
regardless of the other variables manipulated. These effects 
were straight forward. A cooperative motivational orientation 
led to greater cooperation; a competitive motivational 
orientation led to greater competition. Similar findings 
have been reported (Griesinger & Livingston, 1973; Kanouse & 
Wiest, 1967; Radlow, Wiedner, & Hurst, 1968). Gallo (1966) 
manipulated motivational orientation in an indirect way. Half 
of the subjects were told they were taking part in a "decision 
making" study, in which they were to maximize their profits 
without regard for the other player--the individualistic 
motivational orientation. The other subjects were told 
they were participating in a test of "social intelligence" in 
which the more socially intelligent an individual is, the 
more likely it would be that they would win more money than 
their opponent. This condition was the competitive motivational 
orientation Gallo found no eventual effect on joint payoff 
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Schenitsky (1963) reported that if both bargainers had 
an individualistic motivational orientation in a bilateral 
monopoly game, they, more often than cooperative motivational 
orientation players, maximized joint payoff. 
For reciprocity to wo~k, a bargainer must trust his/her 
opponent not to exploit his/her softness but to reciprocate 
it. Such a trust seems more consistent with a cooperative 
motivational orientation than a compecitive motivational 
orientation. Reactions to reciprocity violations are stronger 
in competitively motivated bargainers (Esser & Komorita, 1975). 
Therefore it is expected that the cooperative orientation will 
enhance--'-'rec-i-proc-ity'-'--whi-1-e· a eempe-t-:i:-ave--orientation will 
favor "level of aspiration" effects. 
Motivational Orientation of the Bargainer Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Eight· A competitive motivational orientation will 
decrease reciprocity across all conditions in contrast to a 
cooperative motivational orientation. 
Hypothesis Nine. A cooperative motivational orientation in 
combination with bilateral profit knowledge compared to a 
competitive motivational orientation in combination with 
unilateral profit knowledge will result in more reciprocity. 
Hypothesis Ten A competitive motivational orientation will 
decrease the reciprocity of bilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers compared to cooperatively motivated bilateral 
profit knowledge bargainers. 
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In summary, concession making cannot be explained on a 
straight forward basis by either aspiration level or reciprocity. 
Therefore, more specific variables must be explored. This 
study will investigate three such variables· the unilateralness 
or bilateralness of profit information, the magnitude of the 
initial concession, and the motivational orientation of the 
bargainers. Unilateral profit knowledge, more so than 
bilateral profit knowledge, will be expected to trigger 
aspiration level adjustments. Reciprocity will be more likely 
under bilateral profit knowledge conditions Secondly, an 
interaction is expected between the size of the initial 
concession and the bilateralness or unilateralness of profit 
information. Bilateral profit information is expected to 
moderate reactions to extremity of initial concessions 
(either large or small), while unilateral profit knowledge 
is expected to aggravate initial concession size reactions 
Lastly, the cooperative orientation, as opposed to the 




The subjects were 120 stude~ts who were taking an 
organizational communication class at Fort Hays State 
University. Subjects were both female and male. Their 
school classification ranged from sophomore to senior, 
with a predominance of upperclassmen All members of the 
class were asked to take part in the study. Subjects were 
told they were taking part in a study of bargaining. In 
terms of assignment to experimental conditions, all such 
assignments were random 
Design 
A 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design was used with three 
independent variables. Knowledge of profits was either 
bilateral or unilateral Initial concession received was 
either large or small The motivational orientation of the 
bargainer was encouraged in the direction of either 
competition or cooperation. Fifteen subjects were randomly 
assigned to each of the eight treatment groups 
Procedure 
The bargaining simulation was a buyer-seller game like 
that used by Liebert et al. (1968). Instructions informed 
subjects that they were about to participate in a bargaining 
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game in which the buyer and a seller would attempt to 
negotiate the sale of a used car. Each subject was told 
he/she would bargain through the exchange of written price 
offers with a person in another room 
The experiment was conducted in the speech pathology 
laboratory which contains several small rooms Four subjects 
were scheduled to arrive at each bargaining session The 
subjects were kept ignorant of which other three students in 
the class would be in that same bargaining session. To 
insure that subjects did not see each other prior to the 
bargaining session, the time of arrival for each subject was 
staggered. 
Written instructions explained to the subject that he/she 
and the other subjects were to negotiate a sale of a used car 
All were told that the car cost them $2500. They were instructed 
that they were to make sales offers to the other bargainer on 
the offer sheets which would be provided. 
Independent Variables 
Knowledge of opponent's possible profits. Knowledge of 
opponent's possible pro ts was manipulated through the written 
instructions to the bargainers. Bilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers were told that "Based on information you have 
obtained from a mutual acquaintance, you know that the person 
trying to purchase the car plans to resell it. He/she has a 
buyer, however, you do not know who this person is nor how you 
44 
could get in touch with him/her. You do know that the buyer 
has offered $3500 for the car, and consequently, you can 
estimate the other bargainer's profit by comparing the sales 
price with $3500." Such subjects could easily compute their 
profit and their opponent's profit. Their profit for any 
offer was the amount of that offer minus $2500. Their 
opponent's profit was the result of subtracting that sales 
price from $3500. The total potential profit available for 
splitting was $1,000. Bilateral profit knowledge bargainers 
knew this. In contrast unilateral profit knowledge bargainers 
only know what the car cost them ($2500). They could compute 
their profits but only guess at their opponent's profits. 
Size of initial concession received In the extremely 
small concession condition a bid of $2550 was handed to the 
subject by the experimenter (as if it was from the other 
subject). Such an initial offer conceded 5% of the potential 
$1,000 profit available between the two bargainers. In the 
extremely large concession condition a bid of $2900 was handed 
to the subject. Such an initial concession concedes 40% of the 
potential profit. Manipulation checks verified that 
such concessions were viewed as small and large respectively, 
(see Appendices C and D). These checks were performed in 
the following manner· Students from Interpersonal Communication 
classes were given the basic instructions for being in the 
experiment. Then they were asked to describe a first offer of 
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$2550, or in some cases a first offer of $2900. Eight out of 
eight bilateral profit knowledge students and 14 out of 17 
unilateral profit knowledge students described an initial 
offer of $2550 as a small initial concession. Six out of nine 
bilateral profit knowledge students and 8 out of 15 unilateral 
profit knowledge students described an initial concession of 
$2900 as "fair or reasonablen. Fifty-two other students 
were given the basic instructions for being in the experiment, 
and then were asked "What would be an extremely large (small) 
initial concession?" In terms of mean responses, bilateral 
profit knowledge students thought $2529 would be a small 
initial concession and that $2975 would be a large initial 
concession. Unilateral profit knowledge students thought $2325 
would be a small initial concession and that $4347 would be a 
large initial concession. These manipulation checks verified 
that $2550 and $2900 were small and large initial concessions 
respectively. 
Motivational orientation. A cooperative mot~vational 
orientation was encouraged by the following additional 
instructions in the bargainers· "Remember that bargaining 
requires cooperation. In order for a buyer and a seller to 
agree, they must cooperate by both making concessions When 
neither party makes concessions, no agreement is reached. If 
you and your partner cannot cooperatively agree on a price 
your profit is $0. Hopefully cooperative concessions will 
lead to an agreement. Remember that the other person may 
do you a favor some day. Cooperate." 
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A competitive motivational orientation was encouraged by 
the following instructions· "Remember that bargaining is 
competitive. Every dollar your opponent demands is one less 
dollar from your profit. Keep in mind that you are competing 
against a rival. We want to see how much profit you can 
obtain." 
An independent manipulation check provided verification 
that such instructions did enhance a cooperative (competitive) 
approach to bargaining. Twenty-five students were given the 
instructions to the experiment. Then all answered a four-item 
questionnaire to measure their cooperation or competitiveness. 
At-test revealed that the 13 students given the competitive 
instructions did answer the four self-report questions about 
their competitiveness in a different way than the 12 students 
given the cooperative instructions (t = 3. 61, p < • 01) 
(see Appendix E). 
Before the subject received an initial offer, they 
responded to a pre-bargaining questionniare. This questionnaire 
asked the subject to describe his/her bargaining expectations 
(see Appendix A) 
The subject received an initial concession, ostensibly 
from the other subject, but actually from the experimenter 
in order to manipulate the size of initial concession. 
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The subject's counteroffer was collected by the experimenter, 
and the subject was asked to fill out another questionniare 
while the other bargainer was considering the subject's 
counteroffer. This second questionniare measured the subject's 
aspiration level in a variety of ways. It also measured self-
perceptions and perceptions of the initial concession 
received (see Appendix B). When the subject completed the 
post concession questionniare he/she was debriefed about 
the purpose and proceduresof the experiment. 
Dependent Variables 
The most important dependent variable was the subject's 
counteroffer. It constituted a direct measure of whether the 
subject was responding to either reciprocity or adjusted 
aspiration. 
The Counteroffer as Exact Reciprocation or Nonreciprocation 
Bilateral profit informed bargainers knew their car was 
worth $2500 - $3500. Those who received an initial concession 
of $2900, were, in effect, being asked to accept a 40%/60% 
split of the total potential profit. An exactly reciprocal 
counteroffer would be a 60%/40% split, or a counter offer of 
$3100. Thus, $3100 is the exact reciprocity point for 
receivers of a large initial concession. Those who received 
an initial concession of $2550 were being asked to accept a 
5%/95% split. In that case a 95%/5% split or a counteroffer 
of $3450 would be an exactly reciprocal counteroffer. The 
exact reciprocity point for receiving a small initial 
concession is $3450. Thus each counteroffer can be 
classified as a case of exact reciprocation or a case of 
nonreciprocation. Nonreciprocation would be evidence 
against the reciprocity hypothesis. This analysis can 
be applied to the hypotheses predicting more or less 
reciprocity under different conditions, which are 
Hypothesis One, Hypothesis Seven, Hypothesis Eight, 
Hypothesis Nine, and Hypothesis Ten. 
Counteroffer as Within a Range of the Reciprocity Point 
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Counts of counteroffers were performed to measure the 
percentage of counteroffers that fell within a range of 
plus or minus $104 54 of the reciprocity points previously 
described The amount of $104 54 is one-eighth of the 
standard deviation of counteroffers. This analysis was 
applied to the hypotheses predicting more or less reciprocity 
under certain conditions, Hypothesis One, Seven, Eight, Nine, 
and Ten. It was a measure of the amount of reciprocity versus 
nonreciprocity. 
Size of the Counteroffer as Soft, or Moderate, or Tough Demand 
High counteroffers equal tough demand levels The low 
counteroffers equal soft demand levels An analysis of the 
size of the counteroffer provided evidence as to which 
conditions softened demand and which conditions toughened 
demand. 
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Hypothesis Two posited that unilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers relative to bilateral profit knowledge bargainers 
would be tough in response to softness and soft in response 
to toughness. 
Hypothesis Eight asserted that competitively motivated 
bargainers more so than cooperatively motivated bargainers 
would be tough in response to softness as well as tough in 
response to toughness. 
Hypothesis Nine asserted unilateral profit k?owledge 
bargainers with a competitive motivational orientation would 
be tougher in response to softness than would bilateral profit 
knowledge bargainers with a cooperative motivational orientation. 
Hypothesis Ten asserted bilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers with a competitive motivational orientation would be 
tougher in response to softness than would bilateral profit 
knowledge bargainers with a cooperative motivational orientation. 
The pre and post initial concession questionnaires 
provided many relevant comparisons of the perceptions of 
bargainers These perceptions were of four types· (1) 
changed expectations, (2) 1 perceptions of the opponent and 
the opponent's initial concession; (3) perceptions of the 
probability of reaching agreement, and (4) self-perceptions 
of bargaining toughness. 
Changed Expectations 
Post concession expected profit was measured by self-
report. The fifth question on the post initial concession 
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questionnaire asked, "What is your estimate of your probable 
profit?" Subjects indicated how many dollars of profit they 
expected. It was a direct measure of level of aspiration 
and was thus a method of testing all hypotheses which dealt 
with aspiration level 
Changes in expected profit were measured by self report. 
Post initial concession profit expectations were collected 
from the fifth question on the post initial concession 
questionnaire, "What is your estimate of your probable 
profit?" On the pre-initial concession questionnaire, which 
was filled out after experimental instructions but before a 
concession was received, the same question was asked By 
subtracting the post concession profit estimate from the 
preconcession profit estimate, the amount and direction of 
changes in expected profit were calculated Changes in 
expected profit were a direct measure of changes in level of 
aspiration, and thus were related to all hypotheses regarding 
level of aspiration. 
Post concession minimum profit expectations were 
measured by self-report. The fourth question on the post 
initial concession questionnaire asked "What is the absolute 
minimum price you will accept for the used car?" 
Subjects indicated how many dollars the minimum acceptable 
was. The amount of $2500 was subtracted from this to calculate 
minimum profit expectations. Minimum profit expectation were 
another way of measuring aspiration level, and were used to 
test all hypothesis regarding aspiration level. 
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Changes in minimum profit expectations were comput~d 
by subtracting the post concession minimum described above 
from the preconcession minimum. The third question of the 
pre-initial concession questionnaire asked: ''What is the 
absolute minimum price you will accept for the used car?" 
Post concession expectations of best possible profit 
were collected by self report answers to question number 
three of the post initial concession questionnaire. It 
asked, "What dn you think is the bPst nri,...e that you can 
expect to get from the buyer?'' This was another measure 
of level of aspiration. 
Changes in expectations of best possible profit were 
calculated by subtracting post initial concession expectation 
from pre-initial concession expectation. Question two of the 
pre-initial concession questionnaire asked, "What do you 
think is the best price that you can expect to get from the 
buyer?". Changes in expectations of best possible profit 
tested hypotheses regarding level of aspiration. 
Perceptions of the Opponent 
Questions 8 and 9 of the Post Initial Concession 
Questionnaire read· 
"How competitive is your opponent?" 
VERY COMPETITIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I 
7 NOT VERY COMPETITIVE 
"How cooperative is your opponent?" 
VERY COOPERATIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NOT VERY COOPERATIVE 
By adding the reversed score of Question 8 to the score 
of Question 9 a cumulative score of the perception of the 
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competitiveness--noncooperativeness of the opponent was 
calculated. The lowest possible score of 2 would indicate 
cooperation, the highest possible score of 14 would indicate 
competition. Those conditions hypothesized to show decreased 
aspiration should show a perception of the opponent as 
competitive as well as conditions expected to engage in 
reciprocated toughness 
Perceptions of the Opponent's Concession 
Questions 10-12 of the Post Initial Concession Questionnaire 
in order read 
"Characterize the initial position taken by the other 
bargainers." 
STINGY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 GENEROUS 
"How reasonable was your opponent's initial bid?" 
VERY REASONABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VERY UNREASONABLE 
''How equitable was your opponent's initial bid?" 
VERY EQUITABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VERY INEQUITABLE 
By addine the reverse score of Question 10 to the scores 
of Question 11 and Question 12, a cumulative score of the 
perception of the stinginess, unreasonableness, and 
inequity of the first concession was calculated, The 
lowest possible score of 3 would indicate a perception that 
the first concession was generous, very reasonable, and 
very equitable. The highest possible score of 21 would 
indicate a perception that the first concession was stingy, 
very unreasonable, and very inequitable. Those conditions 
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hypothesized to show decreased aspiration should show a 
perception of "stinginess" as well as conditions hypothesized 
to engage in reciprocated toughness. 
Dissatisfaction with the Initial Concession 
Question 13 of the Post Initial Concession Questionnaire 
read 
"How satisfied are you with your opponent's initial bid" 
VERY SATISFIED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VERY UNSATISFIED 
This seven point self-report scale of dissatisfaction with 
initial concession received allowed a check of whether 
conditions were reciprocating toughness or were lowering 
aspiration. 
Perceptions of the Probability of Reaching Agreement 
Question 7 of the Post Initial Concession Questionnaire 
read, 
"What is the probability that you and your opponent will 
agree on a price?" 
NOT VERY PROBABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VERY PROBABLE 
This was another measure of whether a subject views the 
concession they received as tough or soft. Those subjects 
who view the opponent's concession as one not likely to 
lead to agreement might be saying it is so tough as to 
preclude negotiation 
Self-Perceptions of Bargaining Toughness 
Question 14 and 15 of the Post Initial Concession 
Questionnaire asked 
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"How competitive was your offer?" 
VERY COMPETITIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NOT VERY COMPETITIVE 
"How cooperative was your offer?" 
VERY COOPERATIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NOT VERY COOPERATIVE 
By summing the reverse score of question 14 and the score of 
question 15 an indication of self perceptions of toughness 
was measured. Self-toughness tested hypotheses regarding 
reciprocated toughness or raised aspiration 
Self-Reports of Profit Motivation 
Question 15 of the Post Initial Concession Questionnaire 
asked, "How important was it for you to obtain as large a 
profit as possible?" 
NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VERY IMPORTANT 
This provided a measure of the effect of the experimental 
conditions upon profit-motivation. Lowered aspiration may 
be accompanied by lowered importance of profits to the 
bargainer, so this measure tested hypotheses regarding lowered 
aspiration and raised aspiration. 
CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS 
Hypotheses Relevant to Reciprocity Effects 
Hypotheses One, Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten predicted 
subjects' counteroffers would show a reciprocity effect 
under certain conditions and would show an adjusted aspiration 
effect under other conditions. The key dependent variable in 
analyzing these hypotheses was the counteroffer as a sign 
of either reciprocity or nonreciprocity 
Hypothesis One stated bilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers would exhibit more reciprocity of concession 
magnitude than would unilateral bargainers 
Bilateral profit informed bargainers knew their car 
was worth $2500 - $3500. Those who received an initial 
concession of $2900, were, in effect, being asked to 
accept a 40%/60% split of the total potential profit. An 
exactly reciprocal counteroffer would be a 60%/40% split, 
or a counteroffer of $3100 Those who received an initial 
concession of $2550 were being asked to accept a 5%/95% 
split In that case a 95%/5% split or a counteroffer of 
$3450 would be an exactly reciprocal counteroffer. Using 
either $3100 or $3450, whatever was appropriate to that 
experimental condition, counteroffers were classified as 
being either reciprocation or nonreciprocation. When 
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reciprocation was defined as exactly $3100 or $3450 (the 
reciprocation points) Hypothesis One was not confirmed. 
Bilateral profit knowledge bargainers and unilateral profit 
knowledge bargainers both had the same rates of exact 
reciprocation of counteroffer, which were in both conditions 
6 cases out of a possible 60 cases, or 10% When a range 
of ±$104.54 ($104.54 equals one-eighth of the standard 
deviation of counteroffers) of the exact reciprocity 
points was used to classify counteroffers as either reciprocation 
or nonreciprocation, Hypothesis One was still not confirmed 
(see Table 1). 
Hypothesis Seven stated bilateral profit knowledge bargainers 
would respond to a large (small) tial concession with a 
reciprocally large (small) concession Thirty bilateral 
profit knowledge car sellers received a large concession of 
40% of the potential profit (an offer of $2900 for a car 
worth between $2500 and $3500). A reciprocally large 
counterconcession would be $3100 or less. Only 8 of 30 
(26.67%) made reciprocally large counterconcessions. Thirty 
bilateral profit knowledge car sellers received a small 
concession of 5% of the potential profit (an offer of $2550 
·fora car worth between $2500 and $3500). A reciprocally 
small counterconcession would be $3450 or more. Only 10 
out of 30 (33 33%) did so The combined rate was 18 of 60 or 
30%. The hypothesis was not confirmed. 
Reciprocity Defined as: 
Exact Reciprocity Point 
± $104.54 of Exact 
Reciprocity Point 
Table 1 
Instances of Reciprocity of Counteroffer 
Bilateral Profit Knowledge Unilateral Profit Knowledge 
Reciprocation Nonreciprocation Reciprocation Nonre~iprocation 
6 54 6 54 








Hypothesis Eight posited that a competitive motivational 
orientation would decrease reciprocity across all conditions 
in contrast to a cooperative motivational orientation. No 
differences were found in reciprocity rates between 
competitively and cooperatively motivated bargainers (see 
Table 2). 
Hypothesis Nine predicted the highest level of reciprocity 
would occur in the counteroffer of cooperative, bilateral 
profit informed bargainers, the lowest would occur in 
competitive, unilateral profit informed bargainers. This 
hypothesis was not confirmed. Both rates of reciprocity 
were low and were approximately equal (see Table 3). 
Hypothesis Ten predicted that when considering only bilateral 
profit informed bargainers, competitive motivation would 
decrease reciprocity compared to cooperative motivation. 
This hypothesis was not confirmed. Both were low in terms 
of reciprocity rates (see Table 4). 
Hypotheses One, Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten predicted 
subjects' counteroffers would reflect a higher rate of 
reciprocity under certain conditions and a lower rate of 
reciprocity under other conditions. The differences in 
reciprocity rates in all five hypotheses were statistically 
insignificant None of these reciprocity hypotheses were 
confirmed. The number of counteroffers reflective of 
reciprocity was low. 
Reciprocity Defined as: 
Exact Reciprocity Point 
± $104.54 of Exact 
Reciprocity Point 
Table 2 
Instances of Reciprocity of Counteroffer 
Competitively Motivated Cooperatively Motivated 
Reciprocation Nonreciprocation Reciprocation Nonreciprocation 
5 55 7 53 
20 40 16 44 
2 
X Significance 
0~39 Not significant 
0.63 Not significant 
Reciprocity Defined as: 
Exact Reciprocity Points 
± $104.54 of Reciprocity 
Points 
Table 3 




Reciprocation Nonreciprocation x2 Significance 
3 27 2 28 0.27 Not significant 
9 21 9 21 0.00 Not significant 
°' 0 
Table 4 





Reciprocity Defined as: 
Exact Reciprocity 
Points 3 27 3 27 
± $104.54 of Reciprocity 








Level of Aspiration Results 
Hypothesis Two predicted counteroffers reflective of 
the level of aspiration hypothesis. Specifically, 
"Unilateral profit knowledge bargainers, more often 
than bilateral profit knowledge bargainers, will offer 
concessions of a large magnitude after receiving a small 
initial concession and of a small magnitude after receiving 
a large initial concession." The mean counteroffer reflects 
the size of the counterconcession. Since all subjects 
were sellers, the higher the mean counteroffer, the smaller 
the counterconcession 
The mean counteroffer of a unilateral profit knowledge 
bargainer who received a large initial concession was 
higher (tougher) than the mean counteroffer of a unilateral 
profit knowledge bargainer who received a small initial 
concession (t = 1.72, df = 59, p < .05) (see Table 5). 
As predicted in Hypothesis Two there was no difference in 
the mean counteroffer of bilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers who received a large initial concession compared 
to bilateral profit knowledge bargainers who received a 
small initial concession (see Table 5). The hypothesis 
was confirmed in that unilateral profit knowledge bargainers 
offered smaller concessions when given large concessions 




Size of Concession Received 
Bilateral Profit Knowledge 
Unilateral Profit Knowledge 







larger concessions when faced with small concessions. 
Aspiration Level Changes 
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Hypotheses Three, Four, and Five predicted aspiration 
adjustments. 
Hypothesis Three stated that: Unilateral profit 
knowledge bargainers will modify their aspiration 
levels in response to the opponent's initial concession 
significantly more than will bilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers. 
Hypothesis Four and Five predicted the direction 
of aspiration change in unilateral profit ~nowledge 
bargainers Hypothesis Four stated that unilateral profit 
knowledge bargainers would raise their aspirations in 
response to a generous first concession. Hypothesis 
Five stated that unilateral profit knowledge bargainers 
would lower their aspirations in response to an extremely 
small initial concession. 
Aspiration was measured in three different ways· 
(1) expected profit, (2) minimum profit expectations, 
and (3) best possible profit expectations. 
Expected Profit and Changes in Expected Profit 
After each bargainer had received an initial concession 
and had made his/her counteroffer, each was asked how much 
profit he/she expected. By comparing prebargaining expectations 
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of profit to post initial concession expectations of profit, 
a change in expected profit was calculated for each bargainer. 
As predicted by Hypothesis Three, there was an interaction 
between the profit information condition and the size of the 
initial concession received in terms of the magnitude of 
profit expectations (F = 5.26, 1 and 119 df, p < .05). 
This interaction revealed that bilateral profit informed 
bargainers were not as likely to change significantly 
their profit expectations on the basis of an opponent's 
generous or stingy initial concession than were unilateral 
profit informed bargainers (see Table 6). 
Table 6 
Changes in Expected Profit 












As predicted in Hypothesis Four, unilateral profit 
knowledge bargainers raised their aspirations in response 
to a generous first concession As predicted in Hypothesis 
Five, unilateral profit knowledge bargainers lowered their 
aspiration in response to an extremely small initial 
concession. 
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Expected Minimum Profit 
A second way of measuiing aspiration is to measure 
what minimum profit a bargainer aspires to. After each 
bargainer had received an initial concession and had made 
his/her counteroffer, each was asked how much minimum profit 
he/she expected. Bilateral profit informed bargainers 
had significantly higher minimum profit expectations 
than did unilateral profit informed bargainers (F = 4.48, 
1 and 159, df, p < .05) (see Table 7). Receivers of a 
large initial concession revealed higher minimum profit 
expectations than did receivers of a small initial 
concession (F = 5.01, 1 and 119 df, p < .OS (see Table 7). 
Table 7 
Minimum Profit Expectations 
Profit Information· 
Size of Initial 
Concession Received 









Expected Best Possible Profit and Changes in Expected Best 
Profit 
A third way of measuring aspiration is to measure what 
best possible profit a bargainer aspires to. After each 
bargainer had received an initial concession and had made 
his/her counteroffer, each was asked what was the best 
possible profit he/she could expect By comparing 
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prebargaining expectations of best possible profit to post-
initial offer expectations of best possible profit, a change 
in expeccation of best possible profit was calculated. As 
predicted in Hypothesis Three, an interaction of profit 
knowledge and size of initial offer showed that unilateral 
profit knowledge bargainers adjusted their expected best 
possible profit more to the size of the initial concession 
received than did bilateral profit informed bargainers 
(F = 9.03, 1 and 119 df, p < 005) (see Table 8) 
Table 8 
Changes in Expected Best Possible Profit 












As predicted in Hypothesis Four, unilateral profit 
knowledge bargainers raised their aspirations in response 
to a generous first concession. As predicted in Hypothesis 
Five, unilateral profit knowledge bargainers lowered their 
aspirations in response to an extremely small initial 
concession. 
Summary of Aspiration Adjustment Results 
Hypothesis Three posited an interaction effect of 
information state and size of opponent's initial concession 
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upon aspiration level Unilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers were expected to modify their aspirations in 
correspondence to the size of initial concession received. 
Bilateral profit informed bargainers were predicted to be 
less prone to modify their aspirations on the basis of one 
concession, be it large or small. Three measures of aspiration 
were measured expected profit; minimum profit acceptable, 
and best possible profit. Two of those three measures 
confirmed the hypothesis, and the third followed the 
prediction but fell short of reaching the statistically 
significant levels of the first two measures. 
Change in expected profit was measured by subtracting 
post-initial concession estimates of profit from pre-initial 
concession estimates of profit. Unilaterals raised their 
profit estimates after receiving a large concession. 
Unilaterals lowered their profit estimates after receiving 
a small concession 
When changes in minimum acceptable offer were used as 
the measure of aspiration adjustment, Hypothesis Three was 
not confirmed at the .05 level of significance (F = 2.82, 
1 and 119 df, p = .096) 
As predicted in Hypothesis Four unilateral profit 
knowledge bargainers raised their aspirations in response 
to a generous first concession. They were the only group 
with increased expectations of profit, +$36.67. All other 
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groups lowered their expectations. They were also the only 
group with increased aspiration in terms of best possible 
offer, +$36.67. All other groups lowered their best possible 
offer hopes. 
As anticipated in Hypothesis Five unilateral profit 
knowledge bargainers who received a small initial concession· 
lowered their aspiration (see Tables 6 and 8). 
Perceptions of Opponent Cooperation or Competition 
Hypothesis Six stated· "The perceived competitiveness 
or cooperation of the opponent will be a function of the 
size of the initial concession received." Extremely large 
(small) initial concessions will lead to attributions of 
cooperation (competition) The hypothesis was directly 
confirmed, both in perceptions of the opponent and in 
perceptions of the opponent's initial concession. It was 
indirectly confirmed in measures of "satisfaction with 
initial concession received," in "probability of reaching 
agreement," and in "estimated number of offers to agreement." 
Bargainers who received an extremely small first 
concession viewed their opponent as Bore competitive and 
less cooperative than did bargainers who received a large 
initial concession Receivers of a small initial concession 
rated their opponents' competitiveness with a mean score of 
9 08 on a possible range of 2 ("NOT VERY COMPETITIVEn and 
"VERY COOPERATIVE") to 14 ("VERY COMPETITIVE" and "NOT VERY 
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COOPERATIVE"). Receivers of a large initial concession 
averaged a score of 7.00 This main effect for size of initial 
concession was statistically significant (F = 36.98, 1 and 
119 df, p < • 001) (see Table 9). 
Table 9 
Perceived Competitiveness of Opponent 
Size of Initial Concession Received 
Large Small 
Opponent's Competitiveness 7 00 9.08 
14 = Very Competitive 
Standard Deviation= 0.28 
When the opponent's initial concession was extremely 
small, bargainers tended to perceive it as being "STINGY," 
"VERY UNREASONABLE," and "VERY INEQUITABLE" This was a less 
prevalent tendency with bargainers who received a large 
initial concession. Receivers of a small initial 
concession rated their opponents' initial concessions with 
a mean score of 16.35 on a possible range of 3 ("GENEROUS," 
"VERY REASONABLE,',' AND "VERY EQUITABLE") to 21 (''STINGY," VERY 
UNREASONABLE','" AND "VERY INEQUITABLE.") In contrast, 
receivers of a large initial concession rated their opponents' 
initial concessions with a mean score of 10.58. This main 
effect for extremity of initial concession was statistically 
significant (F = 97.29, 1 and 119 df, p < .001) (see Table 10). 
Bilateral proYit informed bargainers also rated their 
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opponents' concessions as "Unreasonable," 14 47, while 
unilateral profit informed bargainers rated their opponents' 
initial concessions as more reasonable, 12.47. This main 
effect for profit information condition was statistically 
significant (F = 11.70, 1 and 119 df, p < .005) (see Table 
10.) 
Table 10 
Perceived Unreasonableness of Opponent's 
Initial Concession 
Profit Knowledge· 
Size of Initial 
Concession Received· 
21 = Very Unreasonable 









Receivers of small initial concessions were more 
unsatisfied with those concessions than were receivers of 
large initial concessions. On a seven point scale from 1 
"VERY SATISFIED" to 7 "VERY UNSATISFIED," receivers of small 
initial concessions averaged 5.77 compared to the J.55 of 
receivers of large initial concessions. This main effect 
for size of initial concession received was statistically 
significant (F = 79.89, 1 and 119 df, p < .001) Bilateral 
profit informed bargainers were less satisfied with their 
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opponents' initial concessions than were unilateral profit 
informed bargainers. Their level of unsatisfaction was 
statistically different than the level of unsatisfaction of 
unilateral profit informed bargainers (F = 4.92, 1 and 119 
df, p < .05) (see Table 11). 
Table 11 
Unsatisfaction with Opponents' Initial Concessions 
Profit KnowLedge· 
Size of Initial 
Concession Received 
7 = Very Unsatisfied 










Receivers of a large initial concession were more prone 
to say that it was very probable that they and their 
opponent would agree on a price. Receivers of a small 
initial concession were not so confident of reaching a 
settlement. On a scale of 1 (agreement is "NOT VERY 
PROBABLE") to 7 (agreement is "VERY PROBABLE") receivers 
of a large initial concession averaged 5.75 Receivers 
of a small initial concession averaged 4.75. The difference 
is statistically significant (F = 18.78, 1 and 119 df, 
p < 001) (see Table 12). 
Table 12 
Perceived Probability of Reaching Agreement 
Size of Initial 
Concession Received· 
7 = Very Probable 






Receivers of a large initial concession lowered their 
estimates of how many more offers would be necessary to 
reach a settlement. After receiving a generous concession 
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they believed it would take 1.60 less offers than they 
previously believed. Receivers of a small initial concession 
did not lower their estimates to that extent; they believed 
it would take .83 less offers (F = 7.40, 1 and 119 df, 
p < . 01) (see Table 13). 
Table 13 
Change in Estimated Number of Offers Until Agreement 
Size of Initial 
Concession Received· 







Reciprocity Versus Level of Aspiration 
The results of this experiment suggest that the level 
of aspiration hypothesis seems to be a more likely explanation 
of the initial counteroffer than does the reciprocity 
hypothesis. Hypotheses One, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten 
predicted reciprocity None was confirmed Hypothesis 
Two predicted counteroffers reflective of the level of 
aspiration hypothesis It was confirmed in the sense that 
unilateral profit knowledge bargainers offered smaller 
(tougher) concessions in response to larger (softer) 
concessions. Hypothesis Three, Four, and Five asserted 
that aspiration levels would systematically vary on the three 
different measures of expected profit, minimum profit 
expectations, and best possible profit. These hypotheses 
were confirmed. 
There are a number of potential explanations for this 
aspiration adjustment effect rather than a reciprocity 
effect. First, this result is congruent with the majority 
of bargaining studies about reciprocity and level of 
aspiration. Two dozen studies have provided support for the 
level of aspiration hypothesis Only about seven studies 
have supported the reciprocity hypothes , and two of these 
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seven, Lawler and MacMurray (1980) and Pruitt and Johnson 
(1970), documented only a reciprocity of frequency of 
concessions, not magnitude of concessio~s. 
Se~ond~ the softness, prescribed by the reciprocity 
hypothesis, maximizes profits (relative to toughness profits) 
by avoiding deadlocks which result in no profit at all. 
Note that both Hinton (1974) and Komorita and Esser (1975) 
attribute their reciprocity results to this advantage of 
the softness strategy. Perhaps in this study where the focus 
was limited to the effect of the first concession upon the 
first counteroffer, the impact of any potential deadlock 
and loss of profit was not as urgently felt as in studies 
where a deadlock is not just a potential loss but is an 
actual loss of profits 
Third, the bargainers in Hamner's (1974) reciprocity 
study init~ated their reciprocity in the middle and later 
stages of bargaining--not in the initial stage of bargaining 
which was the focus of this study. Also, Hamner's study 
examined the relative effectiveness of softness or toughness 
after a deadlock in neiotiations. Since a deadlock, by 
definition, is toughness followed by toughness followed 
by toughness, perhaps Hamner's finding that it takes 
softness to break the cycle is not so astounding. While 
softness after a deadlock might be effective, in this study 
initial softness was exploited, in congruence with the level 
of aspiration hypothesis and the studies which support it 
Profit Knowledge and Size of Initial Concession Received 
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The results of this experiment demonstrate that both 
a person's knowledge of the potential profit available and 
the size of the initial concession received can affect the 
aspirations of a bargainer. The hypothesized interaction 
between these two variables received consistent support. 
The general pattern of findings matched those of Liebert 
et al (1968), Yukl (1974a), Yukl (1974b), and other 
studies in support of the level of aspiration hypothesis. 
Unilateral profit knowledge bargainers seemed co use the 
size of the initial concession received to set their 
aspiration level Bilateral profit knowledge bargainers 
I 
were less influenced by the size of the initial concession 
received. Rather, the evidence suggests that they use their 
knowledge of the range of possible profit as a gauge to 
judge the competitiveness, stinginess, and reasonableness 
of the opponent. Perhaps their aspiration level is already 
set, on the basis of their bilateral profit knowledge. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study has limitations. An enumeration of its 
limitations can aid in the design of future experiments on 
bargaining so that a more definite test of the level of 
aspiration hypothesis can be made. 
First, this experiment used simulated bargaining. If 
possible real bargaining should be studied. 
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Second-,- in real bargaining, communication is 
unrestricted. In this study the only medium of communication 
was the written exchange of price quotations. If 
communication were unrestricted one might expect that 
bilateral profit knowledge bargainers would quickly reveal 
their profit limits to unilateral profit knowledge 
bargainers who were exceeding those limits in their demands. 
Of course some bargainers may be tempted to exaggerate 
their profit limitations for strat ic purposes Also 1 
some wary bargainers may not believp the communications 
about proi:it limitations since bargaining is somewhat 
aciversa.cial in nature. In dny <.-ase studying bargaining 
with unrestricted communication would restore some o± 
bargaining's complexity to the bargaining research paradigm. 
Third 1 perhaps bargaining for real profits is 
different than simulated bargaining. Perhaps laboratory 
bargaining emphasizes face-saving and self-esteem while 
real money bargainers emphasize dollars not pride. 
Fourthy this study had no real penalty for deadlock. 
In real bargaining 1 failing to negotiate a settlement 
often results in negative consequences Minimally, one 
has lost the time spent in bargaining. Maximumly, one loses 
the potential profits of the deal that got away. Hamner 
and Yukl (1977, p 155) have argued that in situations 
where a deadlock results in zero profits, reciprocity or 
intermediate toughness are superior in ef±ectiveness over 
toughness. 
Fifth, early bargaining, as in this study, may be 
more conducive to aspiration setting and aspiration 
adjustment than reciprocity. Those reciprocity effects 
found, have tended to be in the middle and later stages 
of bargaining. 
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· Sixth, in this study bargainers had no future 
relationship with their opponent. In fact they had no 
present relationship with the other bargainer other than 
whatever relationship one can have on the basis of an 
exchange of written sales offers. They did not see or 
speak to the opponent. Exploitation seems more likely when 
one will not meet one's "victim" again. So, the less a 
future relationship is probable, the more one might expect 
the exploitation of softness by a tough counterconcession, 
that is aspiration adjustment rather than reciprocity. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
First, perhaps the bilateral monopoly simulated bargaining 
studies can be augmented with studies o± real bargaining. Do 
real car salesmen react to initial offers the way people 
pretending to bargain do? Cialdini et al. (1979) used 
actual new car bargaining rather than simulated car 
bargaining. 
Second, the persuasion strategies in bargaining 
should be studied. Communication should become a manipualted 
variable instead of a controlled variable. Are experienced 
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bargainers more persuasive than inexperienced bargainers? 
Are skilled persuaders more effective at winning concessions 
than less skilled persuaders? Will increased communication 
opportunity allow bilateral protit informed bargainers 
to turn unilateral profit intormed opponents into bilateral 
profit knowledge bargainers? Will "fair;' divisions of 
protit be more quickly agreed upon with increased communication? 
Third, the control ot a laboratory study could be 
maintained while making the bargaining less susceptible to 
face saving eftects if real money was available for division. 
Perhaps two students could bargain over how to divide their 
pay for jointly participating in an experiment When 
bargaining tor real money, deadlocks cost more than lost 
time and hurt feelings. 
Fourth, bargaining could be studied with the factor 
of the future relationship of the bargainers in mind. Do 
married couples reciprocate more than friends? Do friends 
reciprocate more than strangers? 
Researchers have much to investigate betore a full 
understanding of the complex process of concession-making 
in bargaining is obtained However, to the degree that one 
may speculate on the basis of this experimental study, the 
level of aspiration hypothesis seems a fruitful initial 
foundation. 
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Appendix A 
(Pre-Initial Concession Questionnaire) 
Before you decide what your first offer will be, please 
answer the following questions. You are not bound to the 
answers you give here, and this information will not be 
given to the other bargaining party. 
What will the other bargainer's first offer be? 
89 
What do you think is the best price that you can expect to 
get from the buyer? 
What is the absolute minimum price you will accept for the 
used car? 
What is your estimate of your probable profit? 
What number of offers do you think will be necessary,to 
reach a settlement? (Please indicate a number.) 
Remember, you are not bound to the answers you give here 
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Appendix B 
(Post-Initial Concession Questionnaire) 
Now that you have decided on your current offer, please 
answer the following questions You are not bound to the 
answers you give here, and this information will not be 
given to the other bargaining party. 
How much profit does the other bargainer's offer give you? 
If you made a counteroffer, how much profit does your 
counteroffer give you? 
What do you think is the best price that you can expect to 
get from the buyer? 
What is the absolute minimtnn price you will accept for the 
used car? 
What is your estimate of your probable profit? 
How many more offers do you think will be necessary to reach 
a settlement? (Please indicate a number) 
What is the probability that you and your opponent will 
agree on a price. 
NOT VERY PROBABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VERY PROBABLE 
How competitive is your opponent? 
VERY COMPETITIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NOT VERY COMPETITIVE 
How cooperative is your opponent? 




Characterize the initial position taken by the other 
bargainer. 
STINGY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 GENEROUS 
How reasonable was your opponent's initial bid? 
VERY REASONABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VERY UNREASONABLE 
How equitable was your opponent's initial bid? 
VERY EQUITABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VERY INEQUITABLE 
How satisfied are you with your opponent's initial bid? 
VERY SATISFIED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VERY UNSATISFIED 
How competitive was your offer? 
VERY COMPETITIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NOT VERY 
O0:HPETITIVE 
How cooperative was your offer? 
VERY COOPERATIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NOT VERY 
COOPERATIVE 
How important was it for you to obtain as large a profit 
as possible? 
NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VERY 
IMPORTANT 
Briefly describe why you made the counteroffer you did. 
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Appendix C 
Perception Check of What Size Initial Concession Should 
Be Used In the Experiment 
Fifty-two students were asked to answer a variant of 
the following paragraph· 
"Pretend you are a used car dealer, let's say 'Western 
Motors.' Another used car dealer, let's say 'Eastern 
'Motors' can buy the Mongoose from you, he plans to sell 
it to a customer for $3500. This Mongoose cost you $2500. 
What would be an extremely large 
Motors?'" 
st offer from 'Eastern 
In some cases (unilateral profit knowledge condition) the 
$3500 value was not mentioned In other cases, the last 
sentence read. "What would be an extremely small first 
offer from "Eastern Motors?" 
Results: (expressed as a mean, number of observations, 







$1,000 - $3,000 
$2,500 
$4,347 
n = 15 





n = 12 
$1,500 - $3,200 
$2,675 
$2,975 




Manipulation Checks of Extremity of 
Initial Concession Manipulation 
(Bilateral Profit Knowledge) Small Initial Concession 
Manipulation Check 
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"Pretend you are a used car dealer, let's say you call 
your company Big Blue Motors. Another used car dealer, let's 
say Andy's Used Cars would like to buy one of your cars, a 
"Mongoose." Andy's Used Cars plans to sell it to a 
customer he has lined up. This customer, it is known» 
~ill pay Andy $3500. This "Mongoose" cost you $2500 How 
would you describe a first offer from Andy's Used Cars of 
$2550?" 
Eight students were surveyed All eight responses 
validate the experimenter's intention that an offer of 
$2550 in this situation is a small initial offer. 
=/fol "I would feel it is not enough profit for me and 
too much profit for him I would ask him to make another 
offer" 
=/fo2 "Ridiculous 1 I think he vs trying to make a large 
profit and cut me out when I'd be the =/fol person helping him." 
=/fo3. "A cheapskate deal. It is not a good business 
deal because Big Blue Motors could probably sell it for a 
higher price that would yield you more than a profit of 
$50." 
#4· "If Big Blue Motors sells it for $2550 we'll only 
be making $50. Should ask for more, A bigger profit." 
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Appendix D (continued) 
://:5: "A little bit low - considering his mark up price." 
1/=6 "Too low_ and I'd bargain for at least 2700." 
=/P: "Andy is offering the low price in case I am 
stupid enough to sell it. Since I'm not, we will dicker 
and he will end up paying around $3,000 for the car." 
=//8 · "Andy's Used Cars' s philosophy of business is 
something abnormal They want maximum profit for themselves 
and lesser profit for their llow Business Organization" 
(Unilateral Profit Knowledge) Small Initial Concession 
Manipulation Check 
"Pretend you are a used car dealer, let's say "Western 
Motors." Another used car dealer, let's say "Eastern 
Motors plans to sell it to a customer he has lined up 
This "Mongoose" cost you $2500. How would you describe 
a first offer from "Eastern Motors 11 of $2550?" 
Seventeen students were surveyed. Fourteen responses 
validated the experimenter's intention that an offer of 
$2550, in this situation, be viewed as a small initial offer. 
#1 "The first offer of $2550 I would consider 
hilarious to say the least." 
=//:2 "A joke" 
=lf3 "Assinine" 
4fo4 · "I would describe it as a 'rip off' because he' 11 
make a lot more money than that sellins it and 
I should be sharing in his profits." 
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Appendix D (continued) 
#5. "Low. Western Motors could sell it retail and 
make more than a $50 profit" 
#6: "Lousy, he wants to make a big profit." 
117 "I would be outraged. I would demand much more 
money. I don't want my competition to make money of 
me." 
{f8. "I would describe it as being stingy since he is 
probably going to make a lot more." 
#9· "As a man tring to make a profit" 
{f 10 · "Would like more money for a car that you paid 2500 
for you're only making $50. Try for a better offer." 
#11: "I would think that the Eastern dealer was trying to 
get a good deal off the Western dealer and would 
turn around and sell it for more." 
#12. "It sounds funny. Dishonest. They have something up 
their sleeve" 
#13. "This does not provide sufficient bargaining and 
negotiating room for me to make a profit. I would 
describe it as too low of a first offer." 
1fl4: "Give other guy a bad rep." 
Three responses indicated acceptance of $2550 as a fair price. 
{f 1 "This would be a fair price " 
#2 "I think it's a reasonable price." 
1f3 "I would think it was a decent offer," 
Appendix D (continued) 
(Bilateral Profit Knowledge) Large Initial Concession 
Manipulation Check 
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"Pretend you are a used car dealer, let's say you call 
your company Big Blue Motors. Another used car dealer, let's 
say Andy's Used Cars would like to buy one of your cars, a 
"Mongoose." Andy's Used Cars plans to sell it to a 
customer he has lined up This customer, it is known, 
will pay Andy $3500. This "Mongoose" cost you $2500. 
How would you describe a first offer from Andy's Used 
Cars of $2900? 
Nine students were surveyed. Six viewed $2900 as a 
moderate offer and three viewed it as a little low. 
=/1=1 "Acceptable." 
=/1=2: "Sounds fair - Big Blue's should get a profit, 
but so should Andy's when he make his sale." 
=/1=3· "Since Andy has lined up the customer, and is 
doing the work and assuming the responsibility for it, I 
would describe it as fair." 
=//=4· "It is reasonable, because both of them are dealers 
who, anyway, try to earn money, and because both the two 
dealers will be able to get some benefit from the deal." 
=/fa5 • It would be the best offer as compared to $3500." 
#6· "Fair but about $100.00 low" 
Appendix D (continued) 
Three viewed $2900 as a little low. 
1/=l "Too low of an offer because Andy's Used Cars 
will profit $600 while Big Blue Motors will only make a 
profit of $400." 
1/=2· "It is a fair offer on Andy's side but if I 
were "Big Blue" I would push up the price. Long live 
capitalism." 
#3 "The offer is rather low because his profit is 
high compared to my." 
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(Unilateral Profit Knowledge) Moderate Initial Concession 
Manipulation Check 
"Pretend you are a used dealer, letis say "Western Motors." 
Another used car dealer, let's say "Eastern Motors" would like 
to buy one of your cars, a "Mongoose." "Eastern Motors" plans 
to sell it to a customer he has lined up. This "Mongoose" 
cost you $2500. How would you describe a first offer from 
"Eastern Motors" of $2900? 
Fifteen students were surveyed Eight viewed it as a 
fair offery an acceptable offer. Seven did not. 
#1. "More than fair" 
:/fa2 "A pretty good offer" 
:/fa3: "I would say great but I would hold out for 3 grand!" 
:/fa4· "The car would cost you $2900. It's a good deal" 
#5: "I would take it" 
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Appendix D (continued) 
#6· "The offer from "Eastern Motors" is a bonus of 
$400. And I think I would be satisfied with it." 
' =l/=7 "I would say that the offer of $2900 is better." 
#8: "The offers higher in that if the customer talks 
him down, he would still be near price its really 
worth" 
:/1=1 "I think the offer is too small" 
=//:2 "It would seem the man was after a profit" 
:/1=3 "Bias, trying to give the other dealer a bad 
reputation" 
:/fa4. "I would think the car would be a lot more than 
$2900. I would he would offer a lot more. 
Really chap guy." 
#5 "ridiculous" 
=l/=6: "A scam by the man from Eastern Motors." 
#7: "Way too low. It needs to be more like $3900. 
Than I might consider it." 
Appendix E 
Manipulation Check of Competitive/ Cooperative 
Motivational Orientation 
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Thirteen students were given the "Instructions" (see 
attached sheet) to the experiment that encourage a 
competitive orientation. Twelve were given the cooperative 
orientation. Each was asked to answer a small questionnaire 
aimed at measuring the competitiveness or cooperativeness 
of the student. This questionnaire is attached It 
consisted of four questions to be answered on a scale from 
1 to 7 A composite score could therefore theoretically 
range from 4 - 28. A 4 would be extremely cooperative A 
28 would be extremely competitive At-test revealed that 
the thirteen students given the competitive instructions 
did answer the four self-report questions about their 
competitiveness in a different way than the twelve students 
given the cooperative instructions. The difference in 
means was significant beyond the 01 level. 

















t = 3.606 















Mean= 15 58 
100 
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Appendix E (continued) 
1. How cooperative are you in this situation? 
VERY COOPERATIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NOT VERY COOPERATIVE 
2. How competitive are you in this situatton? 
VERY COMPETITIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NOT VERY COMPETITIVE 
3. How competitive is this situation? 
VERY COMPETITIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NOT VERY COMPETITIVE 
4. How much do you value a cooperative relationship with 
the other person? 
VERY MUCH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NOT VERY MUCH 
